Most title professionals have seen the pattern: a facially compliant deed, a quick resale, and a claim that lands months or years later when the true owner surfaces. What the industry is seeing less of is honest analysis of where the search failed, what depth would have caught it, and what the claim cost.
The cases in this article are sourced to DOJ press releases and district attorney records. The statistics come from ALTA’s September 2026 Seller Impersonation Fraud Study of 245 title firms across 40 states and D.C., which found that 59% experienced at least one seller impersonation attempt in 2025, up from 28% the year before. Of the firms that saw an attempt, one in four paid a claim.
Why the Loss Lands on the Title Company
A forged deed is void ab initio. It conveys nothing, regardless of how many times the property subsequently changes hands. New York’s Court of Appeals established this in Faison v. Lewis, 25 N.Y.3d 220 (2015), holding that the void status of a forged deed “cannot be changed, regardless of how long it may take for the forgery to be uncovered.” A mortgage recorded against a forged deed is equally void.
Recording offices generally cannot reject a facially compliant deed on substantive grounds, so once a forged instrument is recorded, it sits in the chain. A good-faith buyer or lender cannot cure a forgery after the fact. When a title insurer misses a forged vesting deed and issues owner’s and loan policies, it is insuring an interest that does not legally exist. The true owner can reclaim the property years later, and the claim belongs to the insurer.
A Milliman actuarial analysis commissioned by ALTA, covering nearly 130,000 title claims from 2013 to 2022, found that fraud and forgery claims account for 21% of total dollars paid by title insurers and average more than $143,000 per claim, five times the average cost of all other claim types.
Four Documented Cases
Deed fraud follows recognizable patterns. The four cases below show the most common ones: a forged deed resold before the fraud surfaces, a legal insider using professional knowledge to transfer title, a ring forging deeds into shell entities to deceive title officers, and a licensed title agent falsifying closing documents across a sustained pipeline.
Case 1: A forged deed held for $600,000 in renovation costs
United States v. Franklin A. Olaitan, Washington D.C., sentenced February 2024
Franklin Olaitan caused a false deed to be recorded transferring a First Street NW property he did not own, then immediately resold it to a buyer who spent over $600,000 renovating the house. The DOJ named the true owner, the settlement company, mortgage lenders, the title company, and the buyer as victims of a single forged deed. Olaitan received 40 months in federal prison and was ordered to pay $580,663.73 in restitution. (DOJ USAO-DC)
The title company appears as a named victim because the forged vesting deed was not caught before the policy was issued. A two-owner search examining the instrument that put Olaitan on title, rather than accepting it as a valid starting point, is the search that surfaces a rapid transfer with no financing history behind the grantor.
Case 2: A decade-long scheme by a disbarred attorney across 11 properties
People v. Sanford Solny, Brooklyn, New York, sentenced November 2025
Sanford Solny, a disbarred Brooklyn attorney, transferred ownership of 11 residential properties to himself or to companies he controlled over ten years, collecting rent throughout. He targeted homeowners in financial distress. Convicted on 17 charges in June 2025, he was sentenced to up to seven years in prison. His corporations were fined $120,000 and the fraudulent deeds were nullified on the day of sentencing. Since 2017, the Brooklyn DA has obtained 30 indictments against 42 defendants in deed theft cases involving more than 70 properties. (Brooklyn DA)
The Brooklyn DA notes that most defendants in these cases have been attorneys and repeat offenders. Solny’s scheme ran for ten years partly because each transaction looked clean in isolation. Depth across the ownership history is what connects the pattern.
Case 3: Forged deeds into shell entities used to deceive escrow and title officers
United States v. Mazen Alzoubi et al., San Diego, California, sentenced October and November 2016
Alzoubi and two co-defendants fraudulently sold or attempted to sell at least 15 homes worth more than $3.6 million, completing at least 10 transactions for nearly $2.2 million in illicit proceeds. They forged owner signatures on deeds conveying to newly formed entities with generic names, including “Land Investments 01,” recorded those deeds, then used fake driver’s licenses and forged notary stamps when dealing with escrow and title officers. Co-defendant Daniel Deaibes admitted using an alias and false identity documents to deceive title personnel directly. Alzoubi received 75 months. Deaibes received 24 months. (DOJ USAO-SDCA)
Pippin’s Two Owner Search is specifically designed to flag this sequence: a recent transfer into a newly formed entity with no financing history, followed immediately by a market-value sale. A current-owner search starting from “Land Investments 01” misses the forged prior transfer entirely.
Case 4: A licensed title agent falsifying closing documents across 30 transactions
United States v. Dora Ameneiro Martinez, Apex Title Agency, Haines City, Florida, sentenced May 2024
Martinez, a licensed Florida title agent who owned Apex Title Agency, participated in approximately 30 fraudulent real estate transactions. Her closing disclosures falsely stated there were no existing mortgages on properties, placing new lenders in inferior lien positions they did not know they held. She received 36 months in federal prison and was ordered to forfeit $6,634,750. (DOJ USAO-SDFL)
The Martinez case is not a forged conveyance. It is insider falsification across a sustained pipeline. For lenders, it is the argument for independent search verification rather than relying on the closing agent’s own title documentation. An independently ordered search through Pippin removes the closing agent from the chain of custody for title evidence entirely.
What the Four Cases Have in Common
Each scheme relied on documents that looked valid on their face. Olaitan’s forged deed moved through a settlement company, lenders, and a title company before the true owner surfaced. Solny’s transfers ran for ten years because each one looked clean in isolation. Alzoubi’s ring got past escrow and title officers with fake driver’s licenses and forged notary stamps. Martinez’s falsified disclosures came from inside the closing itself.
In every case, a search that looked past the current record owner, or one ordered independently of the closing agent, had the chance to catch the problem before a policy was issued. The next post in this series covers how often these schemes now appear and the ten chain-of-title red flags that point to them.
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